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As part of the Lancaster GUIDE II project, we have developed a novel wireless access point protocol designed
to support the development of next generation mobile context-aware applications in our local environs.  Once
deployed, this architecture will allow ordinary citizens secure, accountable and convenient access to a set of
tailored applications including location, multimedia and context based services, and the public Internet.
Our architecture utilises packet marking and network level packet filtering techniques within a modified Mobile
IPv6 protocol stack to perform access control over a range of wireless network technologies.  In this paper, we
describe the rationale for, and components of, our architecture and contrast our approach with other state-of-the-
art systems. The paper also contains details of our current implementation work, including preliminary
performance measurements.
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1. MOTIVATION
The recent proliferation of wireless networking technologies and highly portable ‘personal’
computing devices has led to the development of a number of ‘context-aware’ mobile systems. One
important class of context-aware application has been the ‘electronic tour guide’ [5,8,11,21]. Such
systems deliver relevant information to their users, such as reminders, notes or guidance information,
as the systems’ perception of the situation in which it finds itself dictates. For example, a user with a
specific set of interests may be guided to a location containing an exhibit the system determines is
relevant [9]. Moreover, such contexts may be tagged with the annotations of friends, fellow game
players, or other members of the community (comprising users of the system) [4,12].
At Lancaster we have been investigating this application domain since 1997 through the development
and continued refinement of a context-aware tour guide system called GUIDE [9]. The development
of the GUIDE system is the result of a number of contributory activities including: situated
requirements gathering and analysis; deployment of a dedicated cellular wireless LAN in the local
city; modelling of the local city and its associated attractions; and the iterative development and
evaluation of the GUIDE application with real end-users (visitors to Lancaster).
In the current GUIDE system (see figure 1) visitors to Lancaster can equip themselves with a bespoke
‘Guide unit’ from the local tourist information centre. Upon first use, the Guide unit asks the user to
tailor their personal profile to best reflect their interests, dietary requirements and a number of other
preferences. This profile is used by the system, together with dynamic information concerning the
user’s context (including the current location or path taken through the city), to enhance their visit
with appropriate personalised information and guidance advice. A GUIDE user may find out about the
city and its attractions, have individually tailored tours constructed that match their interests, be
guided between attractions, re-orient themselves if they find they have become lost or use a range of
simple interactive services (such as inter-unit messaging, ticket and hotel booking services and so on).
Figure 1 – The GUIDE system in use.
More recently, in the second phase of GUIDE (aptly named GUIDE II [15]), we have begun to
investigate the evolution of the current system into a more collaborative experience that actively
promotes a ‘sense of community’ among users of the system. As a starting point we plan to develop
collaborative filtering, annotation and awareness mechanisms that allow users to be made aware of the
actions, views and recommendations of other users of the system. For instance, one user might be
made aware that another user is sitting in one of the city’s cafés that has also been recommended on
their personalised itinerary and that they are prepared to offer an insight on their experience [10].
Furthermore, by collating and analysing the trends and choices made over time we can construct
‘recommender’ systems that gather information about collective behaviour which is first suitably
anonymised, then used to inform the user’s decisions, e.g. “people with a similar profile to you prefer
this particular café”. Such systems are analogous to the recommendation systems employed
successfully by Internet shopping web sites (e.g. Amazon or e-Bay).  However, in addition to
recommendations, GUIDE II also offers the potential for synchronous and asynchronous interaction
between the users (clearly the acceptance of such a system depends on appropriate respect for a user’s
desires for privacy and anonymity).
To facilitate this work, it is our intention to move away from the bespoke client end-system deployed
by GUIDE and ‘open up’ the network to allow city residents to use existing applications (in addition
to our experimental services) on a range of devices (including their own personal laptops, organisers,
cell-phones etc.). By supporting such services and offering free connectivity to the local population,
we aim to bolster the community of users that may wish to participate in our research. Opening up our
network to public access however, raises a number of important security and administrative concerns
if we are to minimise any potential abuses of the system.
In the remainder of this paper we present our most recent work: a public access architecture called
ACTION (Access Control Technology for IPv6 Overlay Networks). ACTION has been designed to
facilitate the aims of GUIDE II and address the key challenges of this application domain. More
specifically, our architecture is required to:
• Be simple and convenient for potential users (ease of installation, continued ease of use).
• Offer fine grained access control, accountability and auditing for the service provider.
• Offer acceptable levels of security and authentication given the ease of use aims (such that
users can trust the system and the system is not vulnerable to exploitation).
• Support unmodified use of legacy networked applications.
• Offer scalability (both in terms of number of users and extensibility of the system to cover the
metropolitan area).
• Support a range of ‘overlay’ network technologies [27,30] in order to provide near ubiquitous
wireless coverage.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the ACTION architecture
and its access control protocol, which we believe meets the above objectives and provides a scalable
and secure public access network. Section 3 highlights the key components that comprise our
architecture. In section 4 we describe our current implementation status and present some preliminary
performance results. We place our work with respect to other access point protocols and architectures
in section 5. Finally, section 6 presents our concluding remarks.
2. PUBLIC ACCESS OVERVIEW
In this section we discuss the current GUIDE access network and identify how this should evolve to
meet the new objectives of GUIDE II.
2.1 Requirements for a new network
The existing GUIDE wireless infrastructure is based on a network of linked wireless cells deployed at
strategic locations throughout the local city of Lancaster. Each cell is currently based on 2Mbps IEEE
802.11 technology (Lucent Technologies’ ORINOCO system).
Cells are linked back to the campus backbone (and hence each other and the Internet) via an
arrangement of Symmetric DSL leased lines, microwave and point-to-point 802.11 links (in some
cases, these links are provided by an existing educational wireless network established by the EDNET
initiative which links local schools throughout the region to the Internet via our campus network).
Each cell is controlled by a multi-homed ‘cell server’ (a standard low-specification PC, currently
running Linux) supporting two network interfaces: one to the cell (an ORINOCO card with extended
antenna); and the link back to the campus backbone. Cell servers are located in private areas of public
or University owned buildings and are contained in physically secured cabinets.
In protocol terms, the cell architecture is currently based on IPv4 and does not support access to
systems, users or applications outside of the GUIDE system. In more detail:
1. Each wireless cell is a class-A IPv4 sub-network (GUIDE mobile stations are assigned unique
‘ten-dot’ class-A addresses). Cells are thus isolated from each other at layer 3 and intra-host
routing is not possible using IPv4. End-systems are individually addressable at layer 2 within
a single cell.
2. Cell servers are issued ‘standard’ campus class-B IPv4 addresses and are otherwise standard
addressable Internet hosts. Campus backbone traffic and traffic within the wireless cell is not
bridged by the cell server below layer 5 (i.e. it functions neither as a router nor a link layer
bridge).
3. To support inter-host communication, traffic to the Internet is bridged by the GUIDE
Application. There is currently no scope for non-GUIDE applications to route IP traffic to or
from the local cell. The GUIDE application is thus able to have total control over access to
the network.
4. Each cell server runs a proxy-server that disseminates information using a cyclic schedule of
pages broadcast to all users in the cell using HTTP-MU [11]. Clients may request pages (e.g.
from the Internet) using the GUIDE browser, which subsequently get incorporated into the
broadcast schedule. The broadcast protocol is one of the key mechanisms for promoting the
scalability of GUIDE, since by reference locality, co-located clients are likely to require
similar parts of the information base and underlying object model. Furthermore, the
information base is dynamically scoped by the caching strategy of the proxy-server as it
adapts to the demands of its current clients.
5. Every cell has an associated unique identifier. Cells periodically beacon their identifier so that
clients can determine when handovers between cells have occurred. Handover is thus also a
layer 5 issue in the current system.
While this architecture is clearly well suited to the original intentions of GUIDE, it presents a number
of problems if we are to succeed in our objective of ‘opening up’ the system for public access. For
instance, clients are not individually addressable at layer 3, so IP traffic will not be routed between
hosts in different cells. Significantly, Internet applications can not currently address GUIDE hosts
using standard network protocols, prohibiting the deployment of a wide range of popular applications.
Lastly, all applications must be modified to interact using the GUIDE protocol suite (which is clearly
an unacceptable restriction in the general case).
2.2 Key design decisions
To address the perceived needs of the GUIDE II project, we are redeploying and extending our
original network to increase the coverage area and overcome the limitations preventing the
deployment of new applications. More specifically, we have made the following key implementation
choices:
Scalability As identified, we plan to extend the range of our network by taking advantage of
overlay networking techniques. We will extend our homogenous wireless LAN based
network with a heterogeneous mix of appropriate wireless technologies, including
pico-cells giving detailed coverage of individual (potentially indoor) attractions
(possibly based on Bluetooth) and macro-cells providing near ubiquitous outdoor
coverage (e.g. based on the HSCSD  and GPRS 2.5G services [24]).
In addition, we have decided to use mobile-IPv6 as the basis for our public access
work. The increase in address space afforded by IPv6 allows us to federate our
network into a number of separate sub-networks (potentially one per cell). Sub-
netting the network in such a way allows us to use standard mobility support to help
address the issues of host movement between different network cells and/ or overlay
technologies, and makes it easier to provide finer grained access control.
Security An important aspect of public access service provision is to have fine-grained access
control over data traffic originating from the mobile nodes. We are in the final stages
of developing the first revision of our own public access control protocol based on
packet tagging and network level filtering (the focus of this paper). With this protocol
we can determine on a per traffic flow basis which users may access the network and
in which cells, times and durations. Optionally, the system may be configured to
encrypt the entire client payload for enhanced security over the wireless hop to the
access router1. We present an in depth discussion of the design choices for our
protocol in section 3.
Transparency A crucial attribute of our public access infrastructure is transparency. Full
interoperability with standard Internet nodes must be supported to allow the use of
legacy Internet applications and the integration of mobile nodes as 1st class entities.
Moreover, our public access protocol must place no new demands on applications nor
require modifications to the standard network APIs.
Simplicity In terms of client software, the system will be deployed as an enhanced IPv6 protocol
stack that may be installed in parallel with the existing IPv4 stack. Our protocol stack
is designed to replace the existing mobile IPv6 stack and is fully compatible with the
original stack in a standard IPv6 network. A simple client application is used to
prompt the user for their credentials at the beginning of an access session. Legacy
IPv4 applications can be run through the use of IPv4 within IPv6 encapsulation [14].
Considering our design decisions in more detail, it is clear that our public access approach must be
based on an access scheme above layer 2. In more detail, the system must offer secure public access
whilst a) supporting access via a range of possible network technologies, and b) facilitating seamless
handover between such network overlays. Approaches based on port level filtering [1,16] or layer 2
protocols [23,33] thus do not meet our requirements.
2.3 Network Topology
The structure of ACTION’s proposed network is illustrated in figure 2. We assume a network
topology initially consisting of 11Mbps IEEE 802.11b compliant cells connected to a trusted core
network linked back to the campus backbone. The core network is guarded from unprivileged access
by ‘access routers’ (the access routers effectively replace the cell servers of the original GUIDE
system). Access routers are in turn connected to a common gateway that links back to the campus
backbone and from there to the Internet. The gateway additionally acts as a firewall, blocking
malicious traffic from the wireless network (see section 3.4.7).
Figure 2 - The proposed public access architecture.
                                                           
1 This enhancement will offer an alternative to the IEEE 802.11 wired equivalent privacy (WEP) protocol, which has been
shown to be vulnerable to attack [2]. Note that our current prototype does not yet offer full payload encryption
capabilities.
Access to the Internet is controlled by two principles: packet marking and packet filtering2. IPv6
datagrams are tagged on the client end-system using the modified Mobile-IPv6 protocol stack. Access
routers ensure that only packets marked with a valid ‘access token’ are allowed onto the trusted core
network3. Tokens are generated and disseminated throughout the system when clients interact with a
central ‘authentication server’. The mechanisms behind this process are described in more detail in
section 3.
To realise our architecture we are drawing on a number of other research initiatives at Lancaster. The
basis for our work with the Mobile IPv6 stack is the result of earlier research into improving Mobile
IPv6 performance for multimedia data [13]. This work has resulted in the development of Mobile
IPv6 protocol stacks for both Linux and Windows 2000 professional (offering us a good starting point
for our new public access initiative).
Significantly, our work with GUIDE has given us some experience of developing public access
systems and will serve as the prototype environment for our new architecture. Once our protocol has
been suitably refined, we plan to integrate the prototype wireless infrastructure with the recently
announced Mobile IPv6 test-bed collaboration between our department, Cisco Systems, Microsoft
Research and Orange [22].
3. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
Implementation of the first version of our public access architecture is currently nearing completion.
In this section we briefly discuss the primary choices for the various cryptographic components that
comprise our system.
3.1 Client Protocol Stack
As stated above, we have chosen to use IPv6 as the starting point for a client protocol stack. IPv6
offers us a number of advantages including increased address space, simple and extensible option
header processing and powerful integrated services such as support for mobility, stateless auto-
configuration, ‘anycast’ and IPSec. Anycast in particular may allow us to replicate the authentication
server behind an anycast address to increase availability and redundancy. As previously mentioned,
we also have considerable experience with IPv6 [13,19].
The user authentication protocol is based on a lightweight request/ response protocol (a UDP protocol
exchange). The authentication request is secured using IPSec (which supports a number of public key
cryptosystems, including RSA [17]). The public key of authentication server is pre-configured into
each client’s protocol stack at installation time (avoiding the need for a public key infrastructure
(PKI)4). This approach has two main benefits: firstly, the user authentication protocol exchange is
protected from snooping; and secondly, impersonation of the authentication server would require
knowledge of the corresponding private key. We encrypt the authentication server’s response to the
client using TEA5 [34].
The protocol stack marks every packet with a new non-fragmentable hop-by-hop option header
containing the most recent access token. To prevent MAC address spoofing and replay attacks, we
encrypt this token using the shared session key and incorporate a 96-bit MD5 message digest of the
entire IPv6 packet. We encrypt these parameters using TEA and insert it within the IPv6 packet. TEA
has been chosen to minimise the latency due to encryption of the packet tags.
                                                           
2 This mechanism is similar to that used in the Microsoft CHOICE system [3] and offers increased protection (e.g. against
MAC address spoofing) over approaches that do not require modifications to the client software (e.g. Stanford’s
SPINACH [26]). Placement of our work with respect to these systems is presented in section 5.
3 In the future, we may extend access routers to only forward traffic originating from the core network (or the Internet) to
clients holding current valid credentials.
4 Currently absent from the Mobile IPv6 IPSec specification.
5 TEA (Tiny Encryption Algorithm) is a high performance block cipher. There have been no known successful
cryptanalyses of TEA. Moreover, TEA is purported to be at least as secure as the well-known IDEA cipher and is cheap to
compute.
3.2 Authentication Server
The authentication server runs as an application level program on a well-known host and port (the
only host and port the mobile is allowed to communicate with before it has successfully
authenticated). The authentication program manages user accounts and is responsible for processing
incoming authorisation request datagrams. Upon success, the user authentication application sends the
encrypted response datagram containing the access token (generated using Counterpane's Yarrow-160
cryptographic pseudorandom number generator [18]) back to the client and triggers the dissemination
of an update to the access control list (ACL) on the appropriate access router(s).
The authentication server requires a standard IPv6 protocol stack with support for IPSec (in order to
support the secure authentication mechanism). UDP was chosen for the authentication dialogue in
preference to TCP as the amount of data exchanged is very small and does not warrant the overhead
of establishing separate TCP sessions. Reliability is achieved through a simple client driven
retransmission strategy.
3.3 Access Router and Gateway
In our current implementation the access router’s packet filtering functionality is implemented
directly within the IPv6 stack, installed on otherwise standard Windows 2000 Workstations. In the
future we anticipate moving to an active router platform developed at Lancaster called LARA++ [28].
We believe that such a substrate of active routers will facilitate the rapid deployment and evolution of
new services (such as updates to the packet filtering components, QoS support, billing or ‘in-circuit’
diagnostics). The packet filtering and ACL management will each be implemented as dynamic
components that are instantiated into the LARA++ routers.
The gateway router, initially just running standard firewall software, will also eventually be
redeveloped as an active component that attempts to secure the access network from the actions of
malicious external nodes. More specifically, these components will try to detect denial-of-service
attacks (for example, ping floods) based on packet analysis (i.e. packet types, source addresses, data
rate and volume etc.).
3.4 System Operation
The operation of the access control protocol is illustrated in figure 3. In this section we describe the
operation of the protocol in more detail.
Figure 3 – Operation of the access control protocol.
Figure 3 illustrates the access control protocol in chronological order. More specifically, the protocol
consists of an initial ‘user authorisation’ phase during which the user’s identity is verified and the
session credentials distributed. Next, the protocol updates the ACL at the relevant access routers.
Lastly, armed with the user’s session information, the client’s protocol stack can tag its outgoing
packets, enabling them to pass the packet filters without interference. The entire procedure is
explained in more detail below.
3.4.1 User Authorisation
In order to use our system the user will first require our modified Mobile IPv6 protocol stack and the
creation of a set of credentials. The user’s credentials (username and password) are created and stored
with the authentication server by the system administrator. We assume that at this time, the user is
assisted in downloading, installing and configuring the protocol stack on their computer. This
installation is a simple and largely automated process, which meets our stated ease of use objectives.
At registration time, the user is assigned an access group (which may be a singleton, if the user has
unique requirements). The access group permits differentiation of clients in terms of levels of service
(QoS for example) and may place limitations on users’ access to the network (particular cells, specific
times of day, durations or frequencies of use, or payload volume or data rate based limitations etc.).
Since each client has their own unique access token at any given time, we would be able to introduce
per-packet charging/ accounting and different service guarantees (or QoS).
Each time a user wishes to use the network (e.g. turns on their device in one of our cells), the protocol
stack must obtain a valid token in order to be able to tag packets6. At this juncture the user is
prompted to enter their username and password interactively (this process occurs once per session and
the credentials are otherwise cached).
The credentials together with the MAC and IP addresses of the user’s end-system, and a random
session key7 are sent to the authentication server for verification. The MAC address is included as part
of the authentication to link a particular user with a specific set of end-systems, making usage of
stolen credentials more complicated (the attacker would need to spoof the MAC address of the
system) and allowing us fine-grained control of which devices are admitted on a per user basis. The IP
address is used to track end-system location at the application level. Again, at any one time a user
may only have a single IP address for each valid MAC address registered with the system. In Mobile
IPv6 this limitation implies that a potential attacker must remain co-located with the system they are
spoofing in order to minimise the risk of detection. Significantly, this restriction affords us
accountability; whereby we are able to identify abuse of the network by specific end-systems. The
payload is encrypted to help reduce the possibility of masquerading attacks based on snooping a
user’s credentials or impersonation of the authentication server.
3.4.2 Token Generation
As identified in section 3.2, when a known user presents valid credentials to the authentication server,
a unique pseudorandom token is chosen and returned to the client. The authentication response is
encrypted with the session key passed with the client’s request. To avoid brute force attacks on the
token, all tokens expire after a fixed lifetime. Beyond this interval the client must re-authenticate to
continue using the network (using the user’s cached credentials). The re-authentication interval is
chosen to reflect the size of the token (currently 5 minutes and 32 bits respectively).
3.4.3 Packet Tagging
The format of the tag (option header) that is added to each mobile originated packet is shown in figure
4. The header contains the token, the MD5 message digest of the payload and some housekeeping
fields (including protocol version etc.). We have chosen to use an option header in preference to an
out-of-band tagging approach to allow the packets to be routed through unmodified IPv6 routers.
                                                           
6 We assume that this process is an augmentation of the IPv6 stateless auto-configuration protocol that is initiated when the
client enters a new cell.
7 Required to encrypt the authentication response message.
Since tagged packets continue to be routable access routers can be flexibly deployed8 (otherwise an
access router would need to be present at all edge of network access points).
MAC Header IPv6 Header Hop-by-Hop Option Other Ex. Headers IP Payload
0 1 4 873 19
V T Reserved Access Token Message Digest
Encrypted with 128-bit KS
Figure 4 – Tagged packet format.
Since the option header must always be encrypted to avoid possible attack, we chose a symmetric
cipher due to the computational overhead of public key cryptosystems.
3.4.4 Packet Filtering
By default, mobile originated packets are filtered at the access router. The router’s ACL is indexed by
MAC address to simplify validation of packets from (or optionally to) each client in its cell. When a
user successfully authenticates, a copy of the valid token and session key that was distributed to the
client is also passed to the access router so that it can decrypt and parse the packet tags. We pass the
current MAC and IP addresses of the end-system with the token and key to enable enforcement of the
mapping of credentials to end-systems within the cell. We are thus also able to keep track of the users’
current location, making location-based services easy to engineer.
When a packet is received, the tag header is removed9, decrypted using the session key and its
contents validated against the ACL. Any packet that presents an invalid or expired tag, or contains no
tag, is dropped. As identified in section 3.2, the one exception to this rule is that a host may contact
certain well-known IP addresses when first entering a cell to allow contact to be established with the
authentication server.
As with tokens (section 3.4.2), each entry in the ACL has an associated ‘expiration time’ (the token
refresh interval is chosen to be smaller than the ACL expiration time). Beyond this expiration time a
host must refresh its authorisation which causes the ACL at the access router to be refreshed. Having
an ACL in each access router enables us to enforce the admission control policy appropriate to the
client’s access group.
3.4.5 Failure Recovery
In the event that an access router misses an ACL update from the authentication server or crashes and
reboots losing all state information, the access router will erroneously stop forwarding traffic. To
support recovery in these situations we are introducing a mechanism whereby the access router
forwards the tag from an unknown client to authentication server and receives an ACL update ‘on-
demand’ if the credentials are valid (or a negative acknowledgement if it is to refuse the client access
to the network). Using such a mechanism, the state of the access router will gradually be
reconstructed (note that the state of any active clients will also be reconstructed as they refresh their
credentials).
3.4.6 Handover Support
In a network such as ours, we are concerned to minimise the impact of our access strategy on hosts as
handover occurs between cells or between network overlays. In particularly, as a client end-system
hands over to a new cell it must immediately re-authenticate; we aim to reduce the impact of packets
dropped by the new access router during the authentication period. Such losses would introduce
unwanted jitter in continuous media applications and would be interpreted incorrectly as congestion
                                                           
8 Note that the access router should only be moved from the edge of the network if checking the veracity of the MAC
address passed by the client and thus tying the user to specific end-systems, is unimportant.
9 In practice, to maximise performance we do not remove the option header, since it does not affect our ability to route the
authenticated packets and represents little additional overhead. The specific hop-by-hop option is simply zeroed.
by TCP.
In order to address this issue we propose two enhancements to our architecture. Firstly, we intend to
introduce a brief ‘reprieve time’ as a client enters a cell. During the reprieve time an existing
authenticated client from another cell is allowed to continue using the network while the
authentication takes place (i.e. all of the client’s credentials except the IP address are validated at the
access router). However, if the authentication request or ACL update messages are not forthcoming,
the client’s traffic is blocked as normal. Since the client’s encrypted MAC address and access token
are both valid, we believe the reprieve time system offers a significant benefit in handover
performance without too great a reduction in security10.
The second improvement, which works in tandem with the reprieve time, is to introduce the active
dissemination of ACL updates to neighbouring cells of a given mobile. In more detail, when a client
authenticates and the ACL of the access router is updated to reflect the validity of the client, the
update message is sent proactively to a group of access routers that include the immediately
neighbouring cells. When the client roams, a valid token and session key pair have already been
distributed to the access router and the clients’ traffic can be legitimately forwarded until the next
refresh interval. In practice however, we still plan to force the client to re-authenticate its new IP
address upon entering the cell. The membership of the token dissemination group can be adjusted at
runtime based on observation of the mobile’s roaming behaviour (this is the responsibility of a
separate roaming management application to reduce unnecessary loading of the authentication server).
Note that the emergence of the IETF’s context transfer protocol proposal [20] may in the future offer
a standards compliant method for moving the access control state and thereby facilitating a reactive
state transfer solution.
3.4.7 Securing the Core Network
Our public access architecture has been designed based on the principle that the core network is
difficult to attack (the access routers are physically protected by locked cabinets in areas of buildings
not open to the general public). However, our system is vulnerable if a potential attacker can gain
access to this network. To increase the security of the core without utilising heavyweight
authentication or encryption schemes, we plan to use the gateway (see figure 2) as a firewall. This
gateway will only accept traffic originating from the access routers whose MAC addresses are stored
in its access control list11. Furthermore, the gateway is able to monitor for the absence of public access
accounting and authentication traffic that should be associated with user datagrams originating from a
known access routers’ MAC address (further complicating spoofing attempts).
We would recommend a stronger approach (e.g. distributing keys to access routers and encrypting
traffic using IPSec between the core network components), if our scheme were to be introduced into
an untrusted access network. This security could be trivially added using a key distribution
mechanism similar to that used for the client end-systems, or based on static or out-of-band
distribution of IPSec public keys. A summary of the security features of our architecture is presented
in table 1.
                                                           
10 We are continuing to explore a number of other options that may make the reprieve time mechanism redundant (e.g.
decoupling the authentication for a particular cell with access to that cell).
11 The approach is similar to the remote configurable VLAN switch of CMU’s Netbar system [23] and the intelligent hub of
UC Berkeley’s public access system [33].
Potential Attack Protection Mechanism
No Token All traffic except authentication traffic dropped by the
Access Router (no token present or host not in ACL).
Stolen Token Modified IPv6 Stack passes unique random token,




The token and session key have a limited lifetime and must
be refreshed periodically.
Stolen IP Address The MAC Address of client is passed with the token to the





A 1:1 MAC to IP address ratio is maintained and monitored
at the Authentication Server. Token still required.
Masquerading attacks
on authentication




The token is never passed in cleartext over the network.
Brute force attacks
on client’s token or
session key




Encrypted message digest within the token is extremely
unlikely to match the attacker’s payload.
Masquerading as
Access Router
All access router MAC addresses are registered with the
gateway router and physically protected.
Table 1 – Summary of security features in the ACTION network architecture.
4. IMPLEMENTATION STATUS
As a starting point, we have used the Mobile IPv6 protocol stack developed at Lancaster [19]. The
protocol stack currently runs on Microsoft Windows NT family of operating systems. Work is
underway in porting the protocol stack to Windows CE.
The unmodified protocol stack is written in C and occupies 239Kb in its complied form. We have
built two modified versions of this stack: one for the mobile clients which contains the packet tagging
and session key generation functionality; and one for the access router that incorporates the layer 3
packet filter. Our enhanced client stack is 244Kb in size (including diagnostics); the access router
stack is slightly larger at 249Kb.
We have taken some initial measurements using a single mobile client (an Intel Mobile Pentium III
800MHz laptop with 256Mb RAM, running Windows 2000 Professional), an access router (an Intel
Pentium III 766MHz desktop with 256Mb RAM, also running Windows 2000 Professional) and an
authentication server (an Intel Pentium III 866MHz desktop with 256Mb RAM, running Windows
XP). The topology of the test network configuration is illustrated in figure 5.
Figure 5 – Test network configuration.
The test figures are taken on the mobile client in communication with a remote correspondent node. In
the topology diagram above, we can see that the mobile client connects to an IPv6 sub-network linked
through the access router to our IPv6 backbone. The correspondent node and authentication server are
on a further IPv6 sub-network connected to the backbone through an IPv6 capable CISCO router. The
test configuration is sufficiently complex to allow us to ensure that our modified protocol stack is able
to interwork with standard unmodified IPv6 routers and hosts. We are further able to test roaming by
switching the client between sub-networks.
Using the configuration described above, our initial performance results are as follows:
1. The authentication server takes 0.1ms to generate the 4 byte token.
2. The client takes 0.2ms to generate the 16 byte session key.
3. Authenticating (or re-authenticating) the client takes approximately 21.5ms under nominal
load conditions. We estimate that 20% of the overall measurement is due to communication
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Figure 6 – Overhead of packet tagging and filtering for varying IPv6 payload sizes.
Figure 6 illustrates the per-packet overhead of our packet tagging and filtering approach. Note that the
code has not been optimised for performance and contains generous quantities of diagnostic
information. From these early results we can see that the overhead due to our approach is of the order
of 1ms.
5. RELATED WORK
The provision of an access control mechanism for public networks is not a new concept. Many
research projects and standards have already developed systems which provide a degree of support for
access control in IP environments. These systems, however, are not directly suited to wireless overlay
network environments. By far the most common form of access control is MAC address filtering,
where the link layer address (e.g. Ethernet address) of authorized terminals are added to a list of
stations permitted to access a network. Link layer switches can then be instructed to allow traffic to
pass destined for, or sourced from, an address in the list. This approach raises a number of problems,
two of which are highly significant. Firstly, MAC addresses can be relatively easily spoofed (network
cards can often be configured through soft-state or have their EEPROM updated with a new MAC
address, moreover, the TCP/IP stack can be modified to copy bogus header information into layer 2
frames), resulting in unauthorized and undetectable access to the network. Secondly, this method
authorizes a terminal to have access to the network, not the user in possession of it. In a world in
which users readily roam between different terminals, this is clearly a significant disadvantage of
                                                           
12 We suspect that the majority of the CPU overhead is due to database access latency. Improving the performance of client
authentication is the subject of future work.
note.
More advanced systems attempt to tackle one or more of the problems associated with MAC address
filtering by adding more dynamic support into network switches. These include Carnegie Mellon's
Netbar [23], and UC Berkeley's system [33]. Both these approaches rely on additional intelligence
within layer 2 switches, and can dynamically enable or disable ports at will on any switch within a
management domain. As terminals connect to ports and are authorized to use the network, the relevant
ports are configured for full access. As nodes leave the network, the ports are disabled. Although quite
effective, such approaches have issues of control granularity when wireless networks are considered.
For example, 802.11 is a shared medium, and base stations typically connect to wired backbone
networks via Ethernet or DSL into a single port of a switch. As a result, access control operations
applied to that network port affects not a single mobile device, but all the devices within a cell. In
addition, even though both schemes permit user level authentication, they can still fall foul of
malicious MAC address spoofing techniques [1].
All the schemes considered so far have one additional limitation which has not yet been discussed -
they are all tied to specific link layer technologies. Given the heterogeneous nature of overlay
networks (such as the Mobile IPv6 test-bed), the need for a link layer independent scheme becomes
clear - without such a scheme, the manageability overhead of the network would seriously hinder its
scalability, and therefore its utility. MAC layer schemes are still being defined which operate on this
principle, for example IEEE 802.1x [16], which, even though it promises to address many of the
security concerns of IEEE 802.11, would still not operate in a Bluetooth or GPRS environment. More
recent developments have focussed on network level access control techniques based on IP. Good
examples of this are the SPINACH [26] and MS CHOICE [3] systems.
SPINACH uses a Kerberos [32] based user authentication service, coupled with an extended router
(placed between the restricted and unrestricted parts of the network) which filters traffic based upon
MAC and IP address pairs, provides a more secure environment. However, SPINACH is still known
to be less than 100% secure, for example if both MAC and IP address spoofing is performed. MS
CHOICE, however, operates in a similar fashion to our access control mechanism (a packet tagging
scheme), with a few key distinctions. Firstly, our scheme operates on short lived, soft-state tokens (of
order of 5 minutes) in order to increase the robustness of the protocol. Secondly, our approach
provides clear support for cellular systems, in that we use IPv6 subnets to form boundaries between,
and allow enforcement of, administrative domains. In addition, we also perform adaptive and
predictive pre-heating of access control tables for access routers. Thirdly, as the access control
credentials are carried inside an IPv6 hop-by-hop option (which is not necessarily removed by an
access router), it is possible to build hierarchies of protected areas within a network, each with its own
distinct access control rights. Finally, our scheme does not rely on external services such as DHCP or
Kerberos to operate - instead we utilise the IPv6 address configuration mechanism, and integrate a
more specialist and lightweight version of Kerberos into the access control mechanism.
We have specifically chosen not to use the popular Kerberos authentication service since we need to
provide rapid handover performance and subtly different use semantics. More specifically,
authenticating the client and accessing the service (the network) is achieved in one protocol exchange.
Moreover, the authentication server (which effectively contains the ticket granting service of
Kerberos) distributes valid token information to both the client and the access router group pertaining
to that client. These features of our authentication protocol are anticipated to speed up handover
performance significantly.
A considerable amount of activity is evident within the IETF to specify protocols to support and allow
interoperability of access control mechanisms. The Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network
Access (PANA) working group [25] is in its early stages, but promises specify a common mechanism
to replace PPP for user identification. The Basic User Registration Protocol (BURP) [31] is also in its
early stages, but aims to specify the relationship between a mobile terminal and the authentication and
authorization mechanisms in a visited domain. Finally, DIAMETER [6] is an evolution of the
extremely popular RADIUS protocol that provides a framework to enable authentication information
to be distributed between sites (i.e. support roaming of terminals between administrative domains).
Extensions to DIAMETER are also currently being defined to support Mobile IP between such
domains [7]. We are currently planning to extend the Mobile IPv6 test-bed to link to other city area
networks in the UK. As we reach this stage, we plan to integrate our access control architecture into
the DIAMETER framework to allow for interoperability between respective sites.
We believe that the ACTION architecture will provide a high level of security and authentication (at
least as good as competing systems). In addition, our architecture will provide fine grained access
control, accounting and monitoring, enabling us to implement a wide range of access policies and
police for potential abuses of the system. The use of IPv6 and the choice of lightweight mechanisms
and high performance cryptographic protocols should allow the system to scale without significant
performance degradation. Moreover, IPv6 offers us a sufficient address space to allow us to establish
each cell as an independent sub-network (which further enhances efficient and scaleable routing) and
allows us to address the rapidly increasing number of mobile devices.
Finally, our scheme permits unmodified IPv6 applications secure access to the test-bed network.
Efforts are underway to develop a mobile aware IPv4-in-IPv6 protocol to allow legacy IPv4
applications and devices to make use of the IPv6 environment [14].
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have introduced ACTION; a secure and accountable public wireless access network
comprising multiple heterogeneous networking technologies and with sufficient scalability to cover
metropolitan sized areas. Within the context of GUIDE II, this network will enable the continued
experimentation with context-aware applications and provide rich opportunities for development of a
new set of context-sharing and community enhancing applications.
In addition, we believe ACTION offers a number of significant advantages over existing systems:
1. Support for fine-grained access control policies. Unique session information on each user
session combined with cellular architecture allows us to restrict users to specific cells, times,
durations etc. In the future we can augment such information with additional classes of
service or QoS support.
2. Soft-state based authorisation where secret credentials are refreshed periodically, offering a
high level of security (reduced risk of brute force or spoofing attacks).
3. Support for continuous media or streaming applications while roaming. The short reprieve
time and predictive token distribution algorithms minimise latency due to authentication
during the handover process.
4. Scalability; due to the use of network layer routing afforded to us by the large address space
of IPv6 and defining each cell as its own network. In addition, use of Mobile IPv6 will allow
us to construct a prototype 4G environment in which we may integrate seamless roaming
among network overlays.
There are a number of outstanding issues that we have yet to address and is thus the remit of future
work. More specifically, we need to conduct some detailed testing and performance evaluation before
the prototype is fit for deployment and use by the general public. We plan initially to integrate our
protocol with the existing GUIDE network, which will later become part of the Mobile-IPv6 test-bed
[22].
A key aspect of our future work will be to redevelop our architecture as active components suitable
for the LARA++ active routers [28]. We believe that the flexibility offered by using programmable
network components will allow us to more rapidly deploy and evolve new services.
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